Transforming government and transactional politics

Ten years later, Republican Governor George Allen bullied the Democratic Legislature into abolishing parole, building more prisons for all criminals who serve longer sentences, and then allowing people to remain on welfare. Made it more difficult. Both were well received by voters.

Among the governors of the two-party competitive era that began with the first Republican presidential election of the 20th century in 1969, Bariles and Allen were the ones who implemented seemingly unfavorable policies that were enthusiastically supported by most Virginians. not only. Supported.

These gains, many of which persisted beyond a governor's term, may have been driven by partisan, economic, and attitudinal conditions. But there is another factor. The governor, the governor himself, and his approach to policy-making politics. Recognizing that a glorious legacy requires dirty work.

George Al Goethals, a recently retired social psychologist and political scientist at the University of Richmond's Jepson School of Leadership Studies, looks to his mentor, the late James McGregor, as a framework for considering this duality. He proposes a concept proposed by Burns. A presidential historian and leadership research pioneer, he helped launch Jepson in 1992.

Mr. Burns — this shorthand captures the essence of his thinking — presents two categories of leadership that appear to be interdependent. Transformational leadership, or a desire to create change with a lasting vision. Also, transactional leadership. In its simplest form, it's the basics of politics: coalition building, horse trading, and deal-making.

At the presidential level, Burns' favorite subject, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's creation of New Deal welfare programs, and the civil rights breakthroughs and dramatic expansion of the welfare state under another Democrat, Lyndon B. Both were evident in the founding of one Great Society. .Johnson.

The reduction of FDR and LBJ's legacies under Ronald Reagan was also transformative and in that it reflected the grand goals declared by the president and required the consent of the opposition Democratic Party members who controlled the administration. It can be seen as an example of transactional leadership. US House of Representatives.

The stakes in Richmond don't match those in Washington, D.C., but the fundamentals of achieving it are similar.

Democrat Mark Warner withdrew from his campaign promise to lead the Republican General Assembly through 2004 tax hikes for schools, police and social services, which were dangerously starved of cash during the 2001 recession. It was a coup that briefly brought Warner into the presidential orbit.

Just one year into his term, Ralph Northam, a fellow Democrat, has recovered from the personal humiliation of the 2019 blackface disaster and worked with a Congress his party barely controls to restore abortion protections and restore abortion protections. The death penalty was abolished and adult entertainment was legalized. of marijuana.

And then there's Glenn Youngkin, the current Republican governor of Virginia.

Although he won by a narrow margin in 2021, in part because voters in the purple state were dissatisfied with the coronavirus and its effects, including what appeared to be Democratic overreach, Mr. Youngkin felt as though Virginia He has tried to govern as if he had been given a mission from voters to reverse the current situation.

With a divided Congress during the first half of his four-year term, Mr. Yonkin had to settle for far fewer tax cuts than he had hoped for. The governor still got $4 billion.

And later in his term, facing Democratic majorities in the House and Virginia Senate, Yonkin was not only denied further tax cuts, but his proposal to build a $2 billion professional sports facility in Alexandria was in the sand. It collapsed like a tower.

The death of Glenn Dome, who provided public funds, was painful for Youngkin. Because he is currently in a term as governor, and the person holding that office will profoundly shape his, and someday her, legacy. If an opportunity is seen as missed, it can be irreversible.

Plans for the arena are drawn that way.

Mr. Youngkin's Republican allies and Democratic opponents, Partisan, have publicly said that the governor could have made this plan a reality, but the governor has called it a huge economic breakthrough for Virginia. At least two of his predecessors have tried unsuccessfully to attract candidates from Washington, D.C. and Washington State. Maryland Major League Baseball sports team.

Mr. Youngkin's proposal perhaps qualifies as transformational leadership. He said the arena is more than just a place to enjoy sports and entertainment. This will be another component of Northern Virginia, which is being reshaped by the growth of the technology industry, where employees needed space to work and play. I want you to read it as Amazon HQ2.

What Yonkin, teetering in a lame duck state, fails to tell Virginians is that time is rapidly running out for him alone to accomplish something big and high-profile in the economic arena.

Moreover, Mr. Youngkin has to overcome two significant losses. It chose Maryland over Northern Virginia for the FBI's new headquarters, a decision perhaps made strange by public criticism that the FBI is anti-Trump. And then there's the deal he blew up as an alleged communist China front: the Ford electric vehicle plant in Pittsylvania County.

Yongkin's lack of success in the ring, a newcomer to the cooperative governance methods afforded by the hierarchical tradition of corporocracy, may speak to a failure of transactional leadership.

The governor presented the state's deal with Ted Leonsis, owner of the Washington Wizards basketball team and the National Hockey League's Washington Capitals, as a done deal that only needs to be approved by the Democratic-controlled Legislature.

Democrats didn't support it. Senate Budget Chair Louise Lucas, a Portsmouth resident, said the administration is relying on crazy math. The proposal to cancel bonds to pay for all the bricks and mortar will not generate enough cash. This threatens Virginia's highest possible triple-A credit rating, she said.

There appeared to be little conversation about alternative financing that could shift construction costs to Leonsis. And it seemed like I had even fewer conversations with Lucas. Lucas did not contact Leonsis until three days before the adjournment of Congress.

For Yonkin, the downside to reaching an agreement with Lucas regarding the Alexandria Project is that the senator takes credit for the project.

But that may not be a high price to pay.