Image source: dream.ai
According to the victorious Ukrainian tank commander, the video game helped him plan “how” and “where” to attack the much better armed and armored Russian T-90M outside Avdiivka, Ukraine. He said the video game gave him the tactical insight he needed to aim and blind the enemy tank's optics while simultaneously damaging the mechanism that allowed the T-90M's turret to traverse. When the smoke cleared, not only were the Ukrainians unscathed, but drone footage showed the Russian tank smoking and shutting down, crashing blindly into a tree, its crew bailed out and running for their lives.
It was an unlikely victory, but a significant one. Just a few weeks ago, on a cold January afternoon, Ukrainian tankers operating two lightly armored Bradley personnel carriers were battling Russian T-90M main battle tanks, which Russian President Vladimir Putin said were “the best tanks in the world.” Despite the failure of their armor-piercing rounds and the fact that objective assessments show the T-90M to be clearly superior to the American-made Bradley, the Ukrainian tankers had won an unlikely victory.
This vignette shows that tactics learned from video games, when combined with human courage, can be incredibly effective on the modern battlefield. While this battle may be easy to ignore because of its small scale, U.S. policymakers would be wise to study it as another important lesson from today's real-time “combat laboratory,” Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has already recognized that synthetic training environments (STEs) are powerful tools that, if successful, can “increase the efficiency and realism of hands-on training, develop terrain familiarity, provide mission repetition, and simulate combat.” In essence, DoD aims to create playable games that teach soldiers and system operators (or onboard artificial intelligence systems) the realities of war. Meanwhile, from Ukraine to the United States, video games today seem to have become an inevitable means by which soldiers learn about war, regardless of their effectiveness.
So why not combine these ideas? The DoD needs to combine the proven effectiveness of well-tuned STEs with the accessibility and “playability” of video games. There are obstacles, of course—chiefly the Pentagon's software acquisition troubles, its tendency to seek ownership of intellectual property, and issues with multi-system integration. But if the DoD manages these challenges well, the U.S. military can improve DoD tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), advance the design and development of new platforms, and recreate battles in ways that maximize the combat lethality of existing combat personnel and weapons systems.
I've been there, I've done it
Critics would argue that the DoD has tried this before. For decades, the DoD has invested in video games, simulators, and more recently, STEs. Examples of outdated and abandoned projects despite investments aimed at realizing grand ideas such as realistic combat simulators speak to the mixed results of these efforts.
Beyond their laudable ambitions, most of these failed projects have something in common: procurement-related obstacles. Despite impressive progress in recent years, the DoD’s traditional procurement pipeline is not well-suited for software like simulators, STEs, and video games. This is a pressing issue given that not only DoD computers but also weapon systems are increasingly software-driven.
Leverage the market and protect your products
The Department of Defense Ready You may not want to pay a premium for the software that underpins your cutting-edge, ambitious project, but you may not have to. One notable benefit of working with a major technology company (such as Electronic Arts (makers of the highly acclaimed “Battlefield” games), Activision (makers of the well-known “Call of Duty” games), and Red Storm Entertainment/Ubisoft (makers of “Tom Clancy” video games such as “Rainbox Six”), to name a few well-known names/brands) is market presence. Thus, a truly immersive, combat-true “game” that takes into account the DoD’s complex combined arms concepts may have a ready-made audience outside of the military. In a monopoly-purchase-driven defense industry environment, the DoD is accustomed to fully funding projects, but a heavily subsidized project with a major game maker may be attractive to a current market leader with an already strong customer base. As with any dual-use technology, there may be market synergies.
Co-financing with a major video production company poses a risk, albeit a manageable one, of who will own the game. Here, the Defense Department can reap the greatest benefits if it is willing to take a delicate position on intellectual property: creating two versions of the game, one for soldiers and one for fans. There is precedent for this process: video game publishers frequently create different versions of their games for release in different countries. It is also not uncommon for them to release features that adjust the finer details or the physics of the world. This allows gamers to create a version of the game that suits their interests. Given this adaptability, the Defense Department could “lock down” the parameters of a truly combat-accurate version and retain the ability to later “mod” the game and distribute it only to Defense-approved users. This can be done while at the same time allowing a “realistic” version to be released commercially for the public. Thus, with the right incentives, the Defense Department and major video game publishers could work together to benefit each other’s priorities.
Consistent with the benefits of creating two versions of this “game”—one that enables innovation while protecting the Defense Department’s mission, the other that advances the economic interests of video game publishers—there is another potential benefit: crowdsourcing the TTPs. The U.S. military employs thousands of warfighters, whose professional experience and feedback playing such a game would be invaluable for tactical and doctrinal innovation. Moreover, creating a simplified version of the game for the public would allow the Defense Department to crowdsource improvements to the TTPs from non-military customers, thus turning the experience of millions of willing users into a kind of “combat lab” from which the Defense Department can learn. As any gamer will readily attest, winning strategies in the game can sometimes seem counterintuitive, like Bradley triumphantly defeating a Russian T-90M on a snowy battlefield in Ukraine.
Moreover, the Department of Defense should not underestimate another reality: video game fans around the world appreciate realism and authenticity. Thus, a leader in the video game market would carefully calculate the marketing benefits of being the company that officially develops the Department of Defense's first realistic combat simulator, which would also function as an STE and resemble a true A-list video game. Not since the US Army's successful collaboration with Bohemia Interactive and its Virtual Battlefield Simulation 3 (VBS3) has the Department of Defense taken the development of a training aid with a public component (i.e., the video game ARMA3) so seriously.
Collaboration over dictation
The Department of Defense has a long history of seeking experts to supplement its own expertise, but designing a game like the one described here requires the Department to bring to the table a wealth of invaluable expertise about war and military affairs. merge Collaborate with experts in designing playable games. It would be tempting for the DoD to bring a long list of very specific yet vague requirements for this game to the table and become actively involved in its development. Throughout its relatively long history, the DoD has made mistakes by “over-prescribing” what the product should do, or by not giving vendors enough guidance to create a viable product, rather than having robust discussions with system integrators and vendors about developing requirements.
To achieve the desired outcome, the relevant program executive officer must clearly articulate what the DoD needs: a modern, exciting (i.e., “playable”), modifiable video game that can perform true STE, that soldiers genuinely want to play, and that can use play data to train autonomous systems and soldiers, and to fully evolve existing TTPs. Then, defense acquisition professionals must trust industry experts on how to refine these requirements and achieve the outcome. As the world's leading experts on combat and warfare, they must resist the urge to dictate how a maximally realistic and extensible (and later modifiable) game should be designed, developed, and deployed, down to the most fundamental details.
Soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen and parents want Players who play this game should ensure that their gameplay helps the Department of Defense deepen its understanding of modern warfare. This will drive the creation of new tactics and capabilities while simultaneously exposing those same military personnel and their commanders to misconceptions about the effectiveness of old, defunct TTPs. If executed correctly, STE will enable autonomous systems to interact with dynamic, unfolding, player-driven events, providing very “realistic” challenges for on-board artificial intelligence models and/or remote operators. The best way to achieve these goals is for the Department of Defense to draft clear requirements, infuse them with military expertise, and trust video game makers to actually design the games. design game.
Riding the Wave
The so-called “wave” is coming, and defense policymakers and planners must ride it or risk being left behind. The DoD has already acknowledged that the digital world will play a larger and more central role on tomorrow’s battlefield, but it sees the future as filled with STEs and ignores the most common form of “synthetic” training in which soldiers engage: video games. Essentially, the DoD must accept a reality it has been toying with: that its own militaries, allies, and enemies are using video games, both formally and informally, to enhance their combat effectiveness. And some of it is apparently effective.
That said, these games are not yet DoD-ready STEs. They may not be ready for integration and may not be realistic in important ways. Or, to use a commonly used government term, video games today are “stovepipes.” But DoD has the expertise, budget, and influence to integrate these concepts. So, in this article, I have sought to make the most of these advantages by articulating a way forward. DoD should (1) collaborate with leading publishers in the video game industry to leverage proven talent, (2) invest in video games that can function as multiplatform, modifiable STEs, and (3) Sell (4) Free the market from full ownership and allow it to offset the full costs of this “game.” (5) Create STEs where forces can take real risks and fail early and often in their training. After all, “fail fast” is at the heart of modern defense innovation, so the DoD must have the courage to fail first. beginning.
Still, some might make a compelling case for “staying out of the loop” and allowing the market to evolve, which might lead one to dismiss as anecdotal the experience of Ukrainian tankers that outmaneuvered their Russian opponents despite being technologically inferior, and to balk at the Defense Department pouring more money into the uncertain world of software development.
But the Department of Defense (and its allies) benefits from powerful capabilities that our adversaries do not possess. We recognize that we cannot live in a world without risk, and we are willing to take significant risks to ensure military advantage. We also recognize the benefits of training, real or virtual, and we know that a war like the one unfolding in Ukraine has many valuable lessons to teach us, if only we would listen.
So we need to embrace risk wisely, set expectations appropriately, and side with market leaders who want the “good guys” to win. We need to be better equipped to win tomorrow’s conflicts by fighting as many conflicts as we can virtually. And while future wars will certainly not be games, some games will help us win them.
