On April 15, the U.S. Department of Justice announced: Criminal Investigation Bureau Pilot Program on Individual Voluntary Self-Disclosure (Pilot) Designed to encourage individuals to report certain types of criminal activity in exchange for protection from prosecution. The pilot expands on the existing Whistleblower Rewards Program (Program) and introduces a new initiative that provides financial rewards to encourage reporting of “serious corporate or financial misconduct” that is not known to the government. This follows the Department of Justice's previously announced plans to create a. The pilot appears to be aimed at filling the gap left by the program. This means that whistleblowers who are involved in reported criminal activity are not eligible to receive financial rewards.
The pilot assumes obvious truths. Those involved in fraudulent activity may have a more pressing need to avoid criminal prosecution for their actions than to collect a bounty. Recognizing this fact, Pilot created a system in which whistleblowers who were complicit in criminal acts were also entitled to benefits, namely non-prosecution agreements in return for their cooperation. The NPA effectively protects individuals from conviction and punishment, essentially acting as a “get out of jail free card” for those involved in criminal activity.
As the Department of Justice itself acknowledged in its pilot announcement:
The existence of an NPA can provide a strong incentive for individuals to bring actionable and unique information about criminal activity that would otherwise go undetected or impossible to prove to the attention of criminal bureaus and law enforcement agencies.
The pilot lists a wide range of criminal activities that the NPA may be able to respond to.
Violations by or through public or private corporations with 50 or more employees that involve fraud against or deception of the United States in connection with federally funded contracts. However, such fraud does not include medical or illegal medical kickbacks.[.]
Pilots must ensure that the self-disclosure is truly “voluntary,'' “true and complete,'' and that the reporter agrees to “fully cooperate and be willing to provide adequate assistance.'' We have established a number of prerequisites for obtaining qualifications, including: ” Anyone who intends to report under the pilot must also agree to cough up any profits they make.
It is also unclear at this time whether the NPA will represent the floor of people providing information under the pilot. Crown prosecutors will continue to have the discretion to offer her NPA to individuals in “appropriate circumstances”, including those who do not meet the criteria set out in the pilot. But what happens in situations where the criteria are met? Can a particularly valuable whistleblower avoid all sanctions, even the relatively minimal ones that might be included in an NPA? Only time will tell you.
Perhaps the most interesting thing about the pilot is its underlying motivation. While the Department of Justice would certainly like to uncover new cases through such direct whistleblowing, the pilot is clearly designed to achieve far more important results for the government, allowing companies to commit criminal violations on their own. It would change the decision-making calculus we use when deciding whether to disclose. . In announcing the program, the Justice Department said it would encourage companies whose employees it discovers are involved in criminal activity to “knock on our door before we knock on yours.” Please clarify the message. By combining the pilot and the program, the Department of Justice takes another step in its efforts to generate cases from two sources. One is individuals who report information to benefit/protect themselves, and the other is businesses that self-disclose prior to such reporting to avoid harm. The wrong side of such reports.
