Growing 'Russia law' protests threaten Georgian government

As Tbilisi's official relations with the West reach a new low, a new political force of previously disinterested young people is emerging.

On the night of May 1st, Georgia's government got what it wanted. Congress passed the second reading of the Foreign Agents Bill, moving one step closer to a Russian-style crackdown on civil society groups representing the shadowy global “war party.”

It might be a shame that day.

As the bill moves forward (scheduled to complete parliamentary proceedings in mid-May), social media channels have posted images of people using public transport to protest what is widely seen as pro-Russian, anti-European Union (EU) legislation flooded with images of large groups of citizens who do.

Long traffic jams occurred as demonstrators made their way to central Tbilisi. Crowds had so far reached up to 100,000 people during the two weeks of protests, but were expected to exceed that number. As on the previous day, violence once again broke out in the streets.

Numerous arrests and beatings of demonstrators rejecting the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Bill, widely known as the “Russia Law.” There are now signs that the protests are galvanizing a nationwide movement, posing an unprecedented challenge to the ruling Georgian Dream party.

This is not just another curse of political instability in Georgia. Protests last year against the same bill were temporarily successful with large numbers of participants, but many of the protesters were known opponents of the government.

This time, new dynamics are emerging, with many young people actively participating in the political process, creating an uncomfortable reality for the ruling party.Previously, Georgian Dream and its Grease of EminenceBillionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili has always exploited young people's political apathy to his advantage. In the 2020 election, turnout was 57% in the first round, but only 26% in the second round. With new elections scheduled for October and increased political activity, it is no longer safe to assume that the ruling party will easily win the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Indeed, the Tbilisi protests have so far lacked ideas that could unite political parties and ordinary voters. Laws on NGOs and likely to undermine the country's pro-Western position in EU membership currently serve as a powerful glue and motivator. Approximately 86% of Georgians wish to join. And equally surprisingly, there appears to be no demand for powerful politicians to lead the protests. At least for now, these are single-issue protests, with demonstrators not calling for government change, but only for the bill to be repealed.

However, the ruling party is playing a dangerous game. Young people are taking an increasingly hard line against the Georgian Dream, but it is hard to see how this will avoid influencing the vote in October. The longer the protests go on, the more risks are likely to increase.

The government's decision to reinstate the bill, which it had promised to scrap in March 2023, initially upset Western supporters of Georgia. The EU has agreed to start accession negotiations in December, and the foreign agents bill is contrary to EU standards. The country says that he cannot enter the country based on the law.

Street violence by police has only intensified the international backlash. EU foreign affairs chief Josef Borrell, head of the Bundestag's foreign affairs committee Michael Ross, and a number of EU lawmakers condemned what happened in Tbilisi.

Under current law, starting in 2023, non-governmental organizations that receive more than 20% of their foreign financial support will be required to report annually to avoid financial penalties.

The ruling party is aiming to pass the law, and on April 29 organized a demonstration in favor of it, bringing busloads of supporters from outside the Tokyo metropolitan area. The protests were much smaller than the anti-government demonstrations, and were mostly made up of people over 50. Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has announced that she will veto the law, but the ruling party, which has a parliamentary majority, will still be able to overcome it.

It is difficult to say what prompted the ruling party to reintroduce this bill. There are many possibilities, but the most likely is a gross miscalculation of the national mood. A fractured opposition party has shown little real opposition to a fourth consecutive re-election (polls confirm this) and is thought to have been subdued by widespread public apathy, but that was a step too far. Maybe.

It is true that NGOs have seriously irritated the government with investigations into corruption allegations, questionable tenders, and possible changes in foreign policy. Indeed, there are pertinent questions about the effectiveness and political motivations of some NGOs in Georgia. However, the ruling party's words regarding this entire area are ridiculous.

There is also a geopolitical dimension. The law will drive a wedge between Georgia and the West, with the Kremlin seeing itself as a beneficiary.

Russia indeed holds the cards through its military influence in occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with the aim of de-escalating the security situation along the border or re-establishing economic ties between the separatist regions. It is possible that this measure could actually be used by making some concessions, such as: And the rest of Georgia.

Georgia is nearing a crossroads. Maintaining good relations with the EU and Russia is becoming increasingly difficult given the EU's demands for greater openness and transparency. Protesters are determined that the current route should end in Brussels, not Moscow.

Emir Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a Silk Road scholar.

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