Time flies. Believe it or not, the UK government's ambition to use technology to modernize and improve public administration and state institutions is now in its 40th year.
Now, in 2024, artificial intelligence (AI) offers us a miraculous once-in-a-generation opportunity to transform public services for the better and deliver real, tangible, long-term results. It's your turn to bring. For our country. ”
Meanwhile, back in the real world, since the launch of the UK's first whole-of-government website in late 1994, we have watched the more mundane realities of departmental forms, processes and information move from paper to screen. I've seen it. However, there is a big difference between viewing cross-departmental transactions in a web browser and the far more important “digital transformation” of the public sector.
The National Audit Office (NAO) provides insight into the reasons for the longstanding gap between political aspirations and reality. The spending watchdog said the changes are “primarily focused on improving the online experience of the public…Overall, the changes will have a limited impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery…In depth about digital transformation” Without understanding, senior leaders often focus on: Take tactical solutions and quick-fix fixes to avoid addressing fundamental inefficiencies that will increase costs in the future. ”
problem
The NAO's library of reports highlights a number of issues spanning decades, from the Home Office's Digital Services at Borders, to the Inland Revenue's tax digitization, to the flagship failure of government digital services, Gov.uk Verify. There is.
In addition to the NAO's compelling library of evidence, media and civil society reports reveal that policy and technical failures are intricately intertwined and interdependent. They range from violations of the rule of law to routine loss or alteration of data in mission-critical national systems. This problem is alarmingly similar to the failed Post Office Horizon system.
Current examples include:
Unlike the Post Office's Horizon system, where supplier Fujitsu can be held accountable and seek compensation, who is responsible for poor reliability and poor performance when the digital program is owned and designed by an in-house team? It is not clear whether However, as some of these examples demonstrate, in-house design and implementation is not necessarily better at producing successful results than traditional contracting or outsourcing.
cause
Transforming the public sector depends on having the right leadership and team experience, capabilities and culture in place. This is regardless of whether the provision is done in-house or outsourced under government supervision.
However, the right skills remain in short supply and the government's modernization ambitions are at continued risk of failure. This makes it all the more surprising that the government has recently announced proposals to reduce access to technical expertise by preventing small suppliers from bidding for contracts. Wisely, these proposals appear to have been withdrawn following supplier backlash.
The gap between long-standing political aspirations and reality for public sector digital transformation suggests persistent organizational and cultural challenges
Current reported issues with government programs appear to be similar to those uncovered by an internal assurance review in 2017. The review found that approaches to program design and quality of delivery varied widely. These included teams that lacked practical experience in managing and designing scalable, secure, and resilient systems. We found that some teams were checking and approving their own code into production systems without any meaningful quality assurance.
One system was well received for its user interface and was successfully demonstrated in front of an enthusiastic pastor. But it was all “smoke and mirrors” and lacked connectivity to other systems. Everything came to a standstill as remediation efforts were performed to integrate interfaces to existing departmental networks, systems, processes, and data.
Fundamental design and engineering flaws caused the solution to become increasingly slow and eventually lock and hang. As a system intended to support thousands of concurrent users across the UK in near real time, it was not fit for purpose.
Also, time and resources were wasted on hand-made, bespoke, “special” infrastructure rather than consuming everyday services and products. Tactical design decisions pass small-scale unit tests, but when the system is scaled up to meet real-world demand, bottlenecks occur and performance degrades. The solution is approved as suitable for service without verifying that it complies with the law and does not violate the rule of law.
This latter issue reflects the widespread practice of policy and digital teams living in largely separate worlds. However, because policies and technologies are complex, dynamic, and interdependent, they must be co-designed to reflect and respond to ever-changing political, legal, social, and economic conditions. It needs to be managed, developed and adapted.
The problem of technical design departing from policy and legal requirements is not a recent phenomenon. The Regional Payment Agency also experienced similar problems in 2015. The software was locked when multiple farmers (or a single farmer using multiple browsers with his windows) logged in, statutory deadlines were not met, and fines were imposed. According to the NAO, the situation has become so bad that “in response to significant system failures, the online application system has been discontinued and replaced with a 'digital paper-based' application”.
The gap between long-standing political aspirations and reality for digital transformation of the public sector is compounded by persistent organizational and cultural challenges, namely the design, development, and policy leadership and management of large-scale policy initiatives and their associated It suggests a lack of competence and competence in. And implementation. This problem is further exacerbated by the lack of independent policy, legal, and technical guarantees.
correction
There is insufficient data available to definitively assess whether internally developed systems pose more, fewer, or the same level of problems as systems implemented by external providers. However, as many high-profile issues and obstacles make clear, bringing systems development in-house is not a magic panacea in itself if the right capabilities are not in place.
Governments need an independent function to establish objective and ongoing policy, technical and legal guarantees for public sector programs, as forensic account Second Sight has identified with Horizon's problems . You need teeth to be successful and to meaningful information that will help you analyze and identify programs that are drifting or are at risk of drifting, and quickly and effectively flag and fix them. It is also necessary to improve access to And rather than letting “hopeless” programs languish, undermining the government's policy aspirations and draining valuable public resources and trust, we need the power to terminate them in a much more timely and effective manner. .
While it may not be as appealing and eye-catching as the proposition that AI will somehow “transform public services for the better”, it will support digital government and reset it to something better and more successful. An independent cross-government assurance function is essential. , Tracking. This provides important baseline insights, reveals what's working and what's not, and helps you improve your organizational culture, leadership, and skills to ensure better and more consistent results. Support decision-making about where intervention is needed.
And who knows? It is also an important step toward helping politicians realize their nearly 30-year vision of using technology to modernize policymaking, modernize public institutions, and deliver better outcomes for people and businesses. There is a possibility.
