Written by Dennis Crouch
Lindke v. Fried, 601 US ___ (2024) 22-611_ap6c.
This recent Supreme Court decision addresses the question of when a public official's social media activity constitutes a state action for First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. I have been following this case as part of my work on internet and media law issues.
The incident comes after James Freed, the City Manager of Port Huron, Michigan, used the forum to criticize Port Huron's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with comments on Freed's personal Facebook page. This happened after I deleted the Port Huron citizen (Kevin Lindke) and blocked him from commenting. Pandemic. Mr. Lindke sued Mr. Fried, alleging that Mr. Fried violated his right to free speech by censoring him in public.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Barrett, the Supreme Court created a two-step test under which a public official's social media conduct qualifies as an act of state under Section 1983 only if the public official: The court held that
- have actual authority to speak on behalf of the nation on the particular issue at issue, and
- The purpose is to exercise that authority when speaking in relevant social media posts.
The court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Fried's favor and remanded the case for further proceedings along this two-pronged case. Although collateral questions will still remain, the results provide substantial guidance to public officials on how to structure their social media accounts to avoid state action concerns, if they so desire. “Thus, public officials who do not save personal posts in clearly designated personal accounts may be exposed to greater liability.” Social media is increasingly being used by government agencies to disseminate information. Therefore, this lawsuit is important. On the other hand, these same instruments provide important public mechanisms for expressing dissent.
Originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Section 1983 provides a cause of action against anyone who acts under color of state law and deprives someone of a federal constitutional or statutory right. The relevant part of this statute reads as follows: . . Liability to any aggrieved party if a citizen of the United States or any other person within its jurisdiction is subject to or causes the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution and laws; shall be liable. ” 42 USC § 1983. The Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “according to the color of state law” to be synonymous with the Fourteenth Amendment's state litigation requirements. Luger v. Edmonson Oil Company, 457 US 922 (1982). Therefore, to prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must generally show that the defendant's conduct constitutes a state action. West vs. Atkins487 US 42 (1988).
prong one: The court based the first issue in reviewing state actions on the “fundamental requirement that “the acts that allegedly caused the deprivation of federal rights belong to the state to a large extent.'''' Ruger. The court emphasized that private actions lacked the “necessary lineage” of state power and authority, and stated that for state actions, officials “have no written law to represent the state” in the matter at hand. or actual authority rooted in long-standing custom.'' exist. Importantly, this power “must extend to the type of speech that gave rise to the disenfranchisement.” The court gave several examples, stating that “state law may give a state official, such as the secretary of the state Department of Transportation, broad responsibility for the state's highway system, including, depending on the circumstances, “This includes the authority to make official announcements.” But the court reiterated its forewarning against relying on “overly broad job descriptions” to conclude that officials have the authority to represent the state.Quote Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022). In the second example given by the court, the court concluded that a city manager could reliably block citizens from commenting on their personal accounts about health code violations so long as “public health is not within the city manager's portfolio.” Ta. Going forward, her one difficulty with this analysis stems from the American approach of placing all ultimate responsibility on the organization's CEO or key leaders. In other words, if a city has responsibilities related to public health, the city manager likely does as well.
prong 2: Even if the official had the authority to speak on a particular issue, that person would only be entitled to do so if the official “intended to exercise that authority in speaking in the relevant social media post.” Use of social media is considered an act of the state. The court derived a second view from case law that a state action exists when there is an official “intent.”[s] “To act on the basis of state power.” Griffin v. Maryland citation, 378 US 130 (1964). In other words, even if a public health official posts about a public health issue on Facebook, the post will be private unless there is some indication that the post is an exercise of authority. Courts have provided an offline example of distinguishing between the exercise of official authority and statements made in a personal capacity.
Consider a hypothesis from the offline world. The school commissioner announced at the school board meeting that pandemic-era restrictions on public schools have been lifted. The next night, at a backyard barbecue with friends whose children attend public schools, he shared that the board had lifted pandemic-era restrictions. The former is a national measure taken in his official capacity as the president of the board of education. The latter are personal actions taken in one's personal capacity as friend and neighbor. The content of the announcements is the same, but the context is different: a formal meeting versus a private event.
When moving to social media, courts are asking us to look for clues.
- Is the page designated as private? If so, is there a strong (but not irrefutable) presumption that no state action will be taken?
- Does the post explicitly invoke state authority?
- Simply liking or retweeting an official policy is less likely to be considered an official act.
- “Posting using a government employee'' is likely to be considered an official act.
As I read this case, I keep imagining the members of the court having anxiety about their speech at a barbecue party in Washington, D.C. “[T]These officials also have the right to speak about public affairs in their personal capacity. ”
A confusing aspect of this decision is that the court writes about different levels of social media activity: social media accounts as a whole; Individual posts. Individual pages. It also includes certain features such as deleting comments and blocking users. Each seems to have the potential to have an impact. Account-level activity (such as mentioning “personal account”) is often the key determining factor, but mixed usage in a particular post may require more detailed analysis.
In mixed-use cases, where things get a little more dicey, courts require lower courts to examine the “content and function” of each office to determine whether the official intended to exercise state power in that individual office. It seems that he is instructing us to judge whether or not it is.The court stated that “explicitly[e] These are likely to be official, similar to those that simply share information available in other ways (perhaps personal information). The post-mortem investigation aims to ensure that authorities can speak out even on “mixed-use” accounts in a private capacity.
Finally, the court addressed how certain social media features, namely comment deletion and user blocking, affect state behavioral analysis. Comments will only be deleted for the relevant post. [the plaintiff’s] Comment has been deleted. ” But because Facebook's blocking feature works across accounts, “a court will need to consider whether Fried has brought a state action over the posts.” [the plaintiff] I wanted to comment. ” The obvious implication here is that you cannot block a citizen from even one public post. The court said officials who mix personal and official posts without clear designation face “greater potential liability” because blocking them could affect both types of speech. I warned you.
On remand, the Sixth Circuit would need to consider how this newly stated test fits the facts of the case (possibly requiring remand to the district court for further fact-finding). ).
The Supreme Court also decided a second online free speech case in a very short opinion. O'Connor Ratcliffe vs. Garnier, 601 US ___ (2024) 22-324_09m1. The lawsuit involves two elected members of the Poway Unified School District Board of Trustees, Michelle O'Connor-Ratcliffe and TJ Zane, who work to promote their campaigns and engage voters on district issues. We have created a public Facebook page to communicate. Board members repeatedly deleted critical comments posted by Christopher and Kimberly Garnier, parents of children in the district, and eventually blocked the Garniers from commenting altogether. The Garnier family then filed suit under his 1983 section.
The Ninth Circuit sided with the parents, finding state action based primarily on the official “appearance and content” of board members’ pages, finding that officials “intended to be acting in accordance with the law.” It applied a unique precedent that focuses on whether the person is or is pretending to be. ”
The Supreme Court granted the certification; per curium The opinion was reversed and, consistent with the dual nature of actual authority and purported practice exams articulated in Lindke, was remanded for further proceedings and adopted by the Ninth Circuit. He emphasized that the “content'' approach deviates from appropriate state behavioral investigations into the social status of public servants. media activities.
