Written by Sarah Katz
Given Iran's recent launch of three satellites into space, geopolitical concerns about the country's continued threat to the West and Israel could increase amid the Israel-Hamas war since October 7. There is sex. Indeed, although Tehran has so far avoided direct involvement in the war, Iran has threatened Israel and US support for Israel through proxies such as Hamas and Yemen's Houthi rebels. ing. Because of Iran's increasing nuclear and satellite capabilities, Israel and the West have made indirect attempts to disrupt Israel's Western counterparts, especially communications and surveillance in the face of Israeli attacks on Iranian military personnel. Continued attention should be paid to potential indirect attempts to interfere.
In addition to the obvious risks of attacks on government satellite systems, attacks on commercial satellites also pose a risk of data loss. Such loss or theft could prove dangerous in the hands of hacktivists or nation-state actors, including blocking visibility into Iran's nuclear activities. Additionally, defense-related data and protected health information (PHI) of patients being treated at hospitals aboard affected satellites could be potentially critical for both federal and commercial systems, respectively. .
In addition to the well-known distributed denial of service (DDoS) and supply chain attacks used for suppression and intrusion, respectively, backdoor attacks represent a more elusive attack that exploits vulnerabilities in aerospace systems. Masu. To explore this topic more deeply, we turned to Dr. Gregory Falco, LEED AP, an MIT-trained assistant professor at Cornell University's Aerospace ADVERSARY Institute. Dr. Falco elaborated as follows (text has been minimally edited for context):
The bus facilitates all communications throughout the spacecraft. Typically, the subsystems report telemetry data via a bus to the satellite brain for consistent adjustments. If something is chatty, it may mean that it is not programmed correctly or that it is sending back too much data. It could be sending data back to your brain to flood it with false messages or other malicious activity.
Dr. Falco elaborated on how the Chatty Bus could signal attempts to attack satellite systems, such as DDoS or supply chain or backdoor attacks.
This type of vulnerability is also commonly used in supply chain attacks, as the satellite vehicles in question contain many legacy parts. [These parts] teeth [sometimes] Operated or managed by legacy suppliers who don't bother to update their codebases, or have third-party organizations engaged in operations and over-the-air updates.Bus chatter is a common sign of a backdoor installation, but given the lack of a runtime monitor at the end of the vehicle, the cause of the chatter is difficult to decipher [noise].
In the face of potentially hostile activities aimed at gaining a competitive edge in the aerospace sector, defenders are considering not only DDoS and supply chain attacks, but also stealthier backdoors to further improve their capabilities. You can take a step forward. Artificial intelligence (AI) allows you to analyze noise captures in audio or text format, ideally equipped with translation capabilities. This feature is further complemented by a Farsi human interpreter and translator, which clarifies the audio noise and the captured corresponding text via an AI voice-to-text feature.
As for prevention, AI can be trained to detect potential backdoors installed by Iranian attackers by searching for Persian words and code strings during code reviews. Such reviews should be kept up-to-date with the latest security patches, and input sanitization should be performed on a daily basis. Following the principle of least privilege, combined with regular security audits and code scanning, can prevent threat actors from getting into your systems in the first place.
A Persian translation expert can advise you whether the satellite system server logs contain text that resembles common backdoor code when viewed in English.
Given the ever-present social engineering insider threat, phishing remains a hotbed for attackers to infiltrate networks and systems. Aerospace organizations remain wary of emails and other forms of communication with geopolitical themes as Iranian social engineering attempts against Israel and the United States proliferate in the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war There is a need to. These communications may consist of English, Hebrew, or another language spoken in countries considered to be supportive of Israel, and may focus on the Israel-Hamas war or similar political themes. There may be. If a user opens and clicks on a malicious link or downloads a malicious executable file inside it, a backdoor can be installed on the corresponding device or system. An example is an email written using terms such as “war” (Hebrew: מלחמה, mirkhama) or even “negotiation” (Persian: مذاکره, mezakereh). This is associated with negotiations over nuclear and political themes to demonstrate a false sense of diplomacy. intention.
You can analyze messages for forged sender addresses by comparing messages in email headers. from for the field return trip. If these entries do not match, the analyst should use open source tools along with device and network logs to investigate other instances of the domain name and email address observed in his return path. there is. Particular emphasis will be placed on the Persian language and other potential connections with Iran. Suspicions of phishing are further raised when carried out in parallel with other potential attacks on satellite systems, such as DDoS attacks that attackers use to distract security analysts from infiltration by other means. may increase.
When monitoring potential infiltration tactics, defenders must pay attention to a wide range of techniques that can occur simultaneously against multiple geopolitical targets. In the case of Iran during the Israel-Hamas war, threats to both government and civilian satellite systems pose a unique threat, as they conceal not only the surveillance of Iran's nuclear capabilities, but also the target's access to and retention of its own data. occurred.
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